![]() ![]() What kinds of data are currently protected with end-to-end encryption? Most importantly, the iCloud Keychain containing all of the user’s stored passwords to various Web sites, apps, social networks, accounts and instant messengers.Įnd-to-end encryption also protects Messages (SMS and iMessage), Health data, Screen Time, Home data, Voice memos, Apple Maps (searches, routes, frequent locations) and, since iOS 14, Safari browsing history. Nevertheless, end-to-end encryption adds an obstacle to the general procedure of government requests. With Apple refusing to break the encryption and not supplying the governments with the right tools, certain types of data remain out of the reach of the law enforcement – unless they know the user’s screen lock passcode and use Elcomsoft Phone Breaker, that is. It is important to note that, while governments and the law enforcement can still request information that is end-to-end encrypted from Apple, they will get nothing but random-looking encrypted data in return. However, the company officially refuses to do so. If Apple wanted, it could brute-force “end-to-end encryption” in a matter of minutes (if not seconds). Technically speaking, a typical iPhone passcode consists of only 6 digits. What kind of a password? It’s the user’s screen lock passcode, the PIN code you type to unlock your iPhone or iPad, or the system password you use to sign in to your macOS computer. Without that password, no one, not even Apple, can decrypt the data. End-to-end encryption additionally encrypts certain types of data with a password only known to the end user. The company employs a protection method it calls “end-to-end encryption”. There is another layer of encryption Apple uses to protect some of the information is considers the most sensitive. This is also the way your iCloud backups are currently protected, and it is not this type of encryption that Apple is about to scrap. This is how Apple encrypts your iCloud photo library. This is the status quo, and this is exactly what the FBI wants to protect. ![]() Since Apple has full control over the encryption keys, the company will serve government requests by providing a copy of the user’s iCloud data along with the encryption keys. More importantly, governments and the law enforcement can request information from Apple. If a third party gains control over the user’s Apple ID/iCloud account, they can download and decrypt information. The thing is, the encryption keys are readily accessible if one has access to the user’s Apple ID account (as in knowing the login and password and being able to pass two-factor authentication). Without these encryption keys, no one can decrypt anything. The encryption keys are stored on Apple’s own servers in Cupertino. Neither of these companies (nor the Chinese government) have access to the actual data since it is fully encrypted. ![]() The chunks are distributed (randomly or redundantly) across various servers that belong to companies such as Amazon, Microsoft, AT&T, or controlled by the Chinese government if the user resides in Mainland China. On a physical layer, the data is cut into multiple small chunks. All information that the user or their iPhone store in iCloud is securely encrypted in transit and in storage. iCloud encryptionĪpple encrypts everything stored in iCloud down to the last bit. In this article, I want to talk about the technical reasons for encrypting or not encrypting cloud backup, and compare Apple’s approach with the data encryption strategies used by Google, who have been encrypting Android backups for several years. Apple’s decision will undoubtedly cause turmoil and will have a number of consequences. Reportedly, Apple dropped plan for encrypting backups after FBI complained. ![]()
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